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BELGIUM SHOULD NOT CHANGE STRATEGY ON HER CONTRIBUTION TO NATO’S NUCLEAR ROLE SHARINGINTRODUCTION / EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In this policy brief, the author focusses on NATO’s nuclear dimension. He highlights
key challenges in the European security environment and explains essential charac-
teristics of NATO’s deterrence and collective defence, and its contribution to arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
He then briefly describes the contributions of NATO’s nuclear states (and in particular
France’s) to collective security and defence. All Allies (except France) participate in
the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), NATO’s senior body on nuclear matters.
NATO’s nuclear role sharing is at the heart of this policy brief: US nuclear weapons
carried by European dual-capable aircraft (DCA). The author argues emphatically as
to why American nuclear weapons should be kept on European soil and the current
DCA countries should maintain the status quo. Tangible recommendations follow on
in terms of Belgian’s foreign security policy and defence, many of which are also
highly likely to apply to other DCA countries.
MANY CHALLENGES IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT
With the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, the 27 European Union (EU) Member States1 have
the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses regulating some form of defence
cooperation and their response to a threat. However, currently, the EU has neither
the organisation, the political will nor the defence mind-set to ensure her own collec-
tive defence as national sovereignty and European politics are generally hampering
European supranational military integration and preventing a true European defence
cooperation. With 21 Member States also NATO Allies2 and with Finland and Sweden
as very close NATO partners, the Treaty indicates that the Alliance3 is for Europeans
“the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation”. As
Europeans we can or even should regret this, but the hard truth is that European
security still needs American involvement in European security.
Brexit is a major blow for European defence as it harms the idea of defence integra-
tion in the EU and makes it much harder for the remaining Member States to meet
the EU’s set defence objectives. The UK still possesses substantial armed forces,
despite cuts in past years; the UK has been one of the two EU Member States with
nuclear weapons and with a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. British
authorities have officially declared that the UK will remain committed to European
security and defence, but mainly or even exclusively through membership of NATO.2
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superpower. Vladimir Putin’s autocratic leadership style can cause Russia to act
unpredictably. Especially European nations on the Eastern borders increasingly view
Russia’s continued use of “hybrid tactics” with considerable worry, even fear. For the
first time since World War II, she has redrawn borders on the European continent
with the use of military power as a result of her illegal annexation of Crimea (2014),
although Moscow was one of the guarantors of Ukraine’s territorial integrity
(Budapest Memorandum, 1994) in return for the soviet nuclear weapons and
systems that were stationed there. She has created a series of frozen conflicts on her
western flank to prevent former allies from joining the EU or NATO.
Russia’s covert development, production and deployment of the SSC-8/9M729 inter-
mediate range cruise missile were a violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty. The weapon system unequivocally gives Russia a flexible, and
hard to detect, platform for use against European cities with very little warning and
is a significant asset should gamesmanship be involved. The Western call for a
nuclear disarmament is not matched by the Kremlin. For the West, both credible
conventional and nuclear deterrence are increasingly important.
NATO’S DETERRENCE: AGGRESSION OF ANY KIND IS 
NOT A RATIONAL OPTION
Deterrence aims to persuade a potential adversary that any gains from whatever
(reckless or undesirable) action(s) it may be intending are significantly outweighed
by the risks and costs; in other words, the outcome has a potentially much higher
probability of being worse than the current situation. The credibility of defence is
vitally important should deterrence itself fail.
The communiqués produced after each NATO summit of heads of state and govern-
ment provide full details to the wider Allied public and third countries on the
strategic role that nuclear weapons play in achieving deterrence. However, third
parties have to rely on a degree of guesswork in dealing with NATO as it does not
publicise (the majority of) its policies, decisions or potential actions. NATO deliber-
ately ensures a high degree of uncertainty and constructive strategic ambiguity on
the nature, scale, timing and scope of its possible responses to any challenges. A
potential adversary’s perception based on his speculative assessment of his
opponent’s willingness to use nuclear weapons is a key aspect for an effective
nuclear deterrence.
In this light, but also for other political reasons, the policy of “neither confirm, nor
deny” is generally respected by all Allies while NATO makes it crystal clear in its3
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possible presence of US nuclear weapons in Belgium is considered to be the
country’s “worst-kept secret”4.
“As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.” This
sentence has been used frequently in NATO’s declaratory policy on the role of the
nuclear weapon in deterrence and defence, has stood the test of time and never
really been questioned. Indeed, the recent deteriorating European security environ-
ment suggests that this assertion will continue to be appropriate for at least the
foreseeable future. Clearly, the world would become far less safe and much more
insecure for the Allies were NATO not to possess nuclear weapons, especially as
other global actors would continue to have them.
As a result of the dramatic events on the Crimean peninsula and Russia’s hybrid
threats, the Warsaw Summit (2016)5 communiqué of NATO’s heads of state and
government devoted considerable attention to the nuclear deterrent and signifi-
cantly tripled the amount of space given to nuclear capability compared to the
previous summit (Wales 2014). “NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture (…) relies, in
part, on United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and on
capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned. These Allies will ensure
that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective.”
Also, they expressed their resolve to inflict unacceptable damage on a potential
adversary: the Alliance “has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adver-
sary that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that an adversary
could hope to achieve”.
NATO’S “COLLECTIVE DEFENCE”: ONE FOR ALL AND 
ALL FOR ONE
Collective defence is the raison d’être of the Alliance: one for all and all for one,
united and strong in the protection and defence of each other. The key driver for the
unity of the Alliance is the need for stability, security and mutual defence. The
Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary.
The Washington Treaty (1949) lays the foundation for the Alliance as a whole. “NATO
is a defensive Alliance. NATO’s greatest responsibility is to protect and defend the
territory and the populations of its Allies against attack. Any attack against one Ally
will be regarded as an attack against all, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty.”6 Art. 57 can only be invoked if all Allies agree to do so consensually in the
North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Alliance’s supreme decision-making body with all
30 Allies represented in this political-civilian forum.4
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deterrence and defence with an increased readiness and preparedness of national
forces, and a forward military presence in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. The main
drivers at the Brussels Summit (2018)8, that are also applicable to NATO’s nuclear
deterrent, were increased political and military responsiveness, heightened readi-
ness and the improved reinforcement of NATO’s forces. Furthermore, heads of state
and government stated that “the fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability
is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. Given the deterio-
rating security environment in Europe, a credible and united nuclear Alliance is
essential.” Allies have clearly agreed consensually to a renewed “nuclear mindset”9
in the face of the threat posed by Russia and that NATO would remain a nuclear
Alliance.
ALLIES REMAIN COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL, NON-
PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT
The Allies are committed10 to “engage actively to enhance international security, (…)
by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; (…).”
The Alliance seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces and is resolved
“to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear
weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a
way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undimin-
ished security for all.” During the discussions in the NAC on the Strategic Concept,
Belgium has strongly supported and has stood particularly firm on these wordings.
At the Warsaw Summit (2016)11 NATO heads of state and government recognised
that the conditions for achieving any further disarmament were unfavourable due to
Russia’s aggressive actions and military build-up. And at their Brussels Summit
(2018)12 they recalled again that “NATO has a long track record of doing its part on
disarmament and non-proliferation. After the end of the Cold War, NATO dramati-
cally reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on
nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We regret that the conditions for achieving disar-
mament have not become more favourable since the 2016 Warsaw NATO Summit.
Allies remain collectively determined to uphold existing disarmament, arms
control, and non-proliferation agreements and commitments.”5
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As, in the 1960s, the Allies were losing confidence in the US’ commitment to
European security and defence and also complained that the US had too much
control and power over Europe’s nuclear defence, Washington deployed interme-
diate range nuclear missiles on European soil to restore trust in the American
commitment. At the same time, Washington proposed the creation of a MultiLateral
Force (MLF) in order to convince Germany and France not to have their own nuclear
forces. By 1965, the idea of such a European nuclear force under American control
had been abandoned as this MLF had proven to be military feasible but politically
undesirable. “The debates over the MLF showed the preference of most of
European countries for either American or national nuclear deterrence over
European cooperation in the nuclear field.”13 The following year, général de Gaulle
withdrew France from NATO’s military integrated structure with Belgium becoming
the new host nation for the NATO headquarters. NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group
(NPG) was created as a consequence of the French withdrawal. It provided a forum
for political consultation and discussion on nuclear issues which had become a
growing concern, especially for the smaller Allies.
Since then, the NPG is NATO’s senior body on nuclear matters and is the only formal
body dealing with nuclear affairs. All Allies, except France, participate in the deliber-
ations in the NPG. It meets at least annually in the format of 29 NATO Defence minis-
ters and, as required, at the level of permanent representatives (ambassadors). It is
important to realise that “all NATO nuclear decision-making is done at the political
level, through the NPG. NATO does not delegate any decision about the use or
employment of nuclear capabilities to military commanders. Absolutely no delega-
tion to commanders in the field.”14
NATO’S NUCLEAR FORCES
Three of the five “nuclear-weapons states” of the Non-Proliferation Treaty15 (NPT,
1967) are NATO Allies: France, the UK and the US.
In the 2010 Strategic Concept the Allies agree that the “supreme guarantee of the
security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance,
particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of
the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own,
contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.”16 “These Allies’
separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the
calculations of potential adversaries.”176
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“broadest possible participation of Allies concerned in their agreed nuclear
burden-sharing arrangements” so that as many Allies as politically and militarily
possible would share a role or responsibility in support of the nuclear mission of the
Alliance. In the 2010 Strategic Concept these arrangements were called “peacetime
basing of nuclear forces, and command, control and consultation arrangements”.
1. “La France ne dépend d’aucune autre puissance pour ce qui 
est de sa sécurité”
France relies on her nuclear deterrence as the ultimate guarantor of her national
security and independence against any form of aggression19. She applies the three
principles of ‘permanence, credibility and strictly sufficient’ to her nuclear deter-
rence (“la force de frappe”).
In 2009, France re-joined NATO’s integrated military structure with two particular
objectives in mind: “increasing French presence and influence in the Alliance, and
facilitating the strengthening of a “Europe of defence”‘. There were a number of
fundamental conditions underpinning her decision including “the retention of its
nuclear independence, France thus decided not to join the NPG”20. France continues
to retain the political position on multilateral consultation she has held since the
1960s.
French president Macron put forward new proposals21 at the beginning of 2020. At
the same time, he reiterated that nuclear deterrence remains a corner stone of
French security; he reconfirmed that France would continue not to participate in the
nuclear planning mechanisms of the Alliance and would never do so as he does “not
want to dilute French nuclear forces in NATO”. However, he remains committed to
France continuing to promote the nuclear culture of the Alliance at the political level.
Turning to purely European matters, as France will be the only EU Member State with
a nuclear capability post-Brexit, Macron has expressed a hope that Europeans will
engage in dialogue on a possible role for French nuclear deterrence in the collective
security of Europe. He sees moving in this direction as a natural expression of
solidarity by France in bolstering her commitment to European security and defence
although Macron is unwilling to give up French independent national decision
making. In the first place, he would like to see strategic dialogue with the other four
EU countries22 that can and remain committed to delivering NATO’s nuclear
weapons through nuclear role sharing. Macron’s proposals were met with a distinct
lack of enthusiasm at the level of the EU and NATO.
France has never given any internal consideration to stationing its nuclear-armed
Rafale outside French territory or deploying them on the French aircraft carrier. It
therefore looks doubtful that France would want to replace NATO’s nuclear sharing7
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foreseeable future, nuclear role sharing within NATO remains the only realistic and
viable option for Europe’s security and defence.
2. UK: “a nuclear deterrent to autonomously protect the UK”
London maintains a nuclear deterrent to protect the UK and, since 1969, has
operated “an independent deterrent”23 with at least one of four nuclear-armed
submarines being on patrol at any one time: the “continuous at sea deterrence”
(CASD). The UK maintains sovereign and total control when it comes to the use of her
nuclear assets and all associated decision-making.
The UK is an actively participating Ally in the NPG and assigns all its nuclear weapons
to the defence of NATO.
3. US: the only Ally applying nuclear role sharing
Even as early in the 1960s, US has given solid assurance of solidarity indicating “that
the United States will continue to make available for the Alliance nuclear weapons
adequate in number and kind to meet the needs of NATO defence. The US has a
comprehensive programme for supplying nuclear weapons or for supporting its own
and other countries’ forces earmarked for SACEUR24 […]”25.
The US has at his disposal of a full ‘nuclear triad’ with a mix of air-, ground- and sea-
based nuclear systems, covering strategic and sub-strategic26 nuclear weapons.
Of the three NATO Allies that are nuclear-weapons states, only the US applies a
nuclear role sharing, which will be further elaborated on later in this policy brief.
Furthermore, it is only the US that has the potential to draw on the broad and full
spectrum of military power.
Notwithstanding that (former) president Trump regularly questioned the value of
the NATO Alliance to the US and placed conditions on providing the American hard
security assurance, it is worth noting that there is currently no credible alternative to
the way in which Europe can receive strong security guarantees other than through
the NATO framework.8
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WEAPON CARRIED BY EUROPEAN DCA
Nuclear role sharing represents the only common nuclear deterrent capability
within the Alliance. Nuclear weapons of the B61-family27 are forward deployed on
European soil by the United States and the US maintains absolute control and
custody. Infrastructure is provided by the NPG Allies and in the spirit of solidarity
Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, as well as Greece28 and Turkey29
provide dual-capable aircraft (DCA) to the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence mission.
These fighter aircraft can execute conventional air operations, however, at the same
time they are available for nuclear roles at various levels of readiness, and are
equipped to carry also nuclear bombs in a conflict. Pilots and personnel are trained
accordingly. The DCA role has the effect of (re)assuring European nations that the US
continues to extend its nuclear deterrence through NATO: both are mutually self-
reinforcing. Nuclear role sharing nurtures transatlantic burden and risk sharing.
Some other Allies provide military support for the DCA strike mission with conven-
tional forces and capabilities.
The arrangement has evolved over time and largely as a means of reassuring
European Allies on the US’ nuclear commitment to them. Accordingly, some
European Allies have purposefully not developed their own nuclear capabilities and
joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, even in times when the USSR and the
Warsaw Pact threatened them existentially with their considerable military advan-
tage in the 1960s and later. Over the years, nuclear sharing has been considered as
the ultimate proof of the transatlantic bond. Today, there is no genuine political will
for European Allies (except in France and the UK) to develop and/or possess nuclear
weapons; for some Allies even being able to agree to nuclear sharing arrangements
is less than straightforward and they certainly do not wish to engage in this any more
fully than they already do today.
Nuclear role sharing is also viewed as a political instrument in the hands of the
30 NATO Allies who can visibly escalate warnings to deter any potential adversary
thinking of acting foolishly. To achieve this, they demonstrate their collective willing-
ness by having a mix of flexible (de-)escalatory options available which includes
Allies being able to further raise readiness levels, to move aircraft and/or weapons
closer to the disputed area or to the potential adversary, and ultimately to launch a
strike mission. One obvious and unique advantage for the gravity bomb B61 is that it
can ultimately be recalled right up to the moment it is due to be released. Clearly
NATO’s nuclear deterrent is a military instrument to support the political decision-
making of the 30 Allies. There is no consensus to substantially change NATO’s nuclear
posture at the present time.9
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less than that of a strategic missile. However, this limitation can be used to good
advantage as it provides more options than otherwise would be the case in being
able to counter Russian limited-use tactics (even though the Alliance refuses to
engage in tit-for-tat tactics).
Current warfare operating procedures are likely to prioritise the use of stand-off
weapons above gravity bombs. Consideration could therefore be given for relying
entirely on the powerful and modern weapons in the US’ vast nuclear arsenal30 in
fulfilling the role of “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies”. Of course,
the quantity and the quality of the US’ nuclear arsenal is more than sufficient to
ensure deterrence and defence. But, again, there is no consensus among Allies to
change the present nuclear sharing modus operandi and arrangements. Over-
reliance on the US’ vast nuclear territorial arsenal would erase the Allies’ “broadest
participation in nuclear burden sharing” as well as their interest and involvement in
nuclear consultations: transatlantic collective security would be diluted and
European Allies would increasingly question American commitment to European
security; some European Allies could even start looking for undesirable remedies.
Furthermore, the European Allies will not accept a sole and direct dependence on
the US’ vast nuclear arsenal without having access to a collective (albeit smaller)
weapon on European soil or a political say in the decision-making process which
should be multilateral; one should not forget that the use of such nuclear weapons
would be on the European continent. NATO’s nuclear sharing at least provides
European Allies with a decision-making capability in the worst case. Furthermore,
while Europe is not ready or capable of assuring her own deterrence and defence,
there would be a very high risk of decoupling European and American security as the
US would be far less critically involved in European security: the European ‘supreme
layer’ would be non-existent and European Allies could be more easily exposed to
coercion. One should recall that, historically, the US has created the mechanism of
nuclear burden sharing with American nuclear weapons on European soil in order to
meet European security concerns and to prevent nuclear proliferation on the
European continent: these objectives have not changed.
It is clear that the political benefits of nuclear role sharing in the NATO framework
outweigh the military limitations.
1. Nuclear role sharing: the US maintains full control and 
custody over its capabilities
The US maintains full control and custody over its nuclear capabilities whether on
US territory or European soil. In the latter case, the US has “munition support squad-
rons” 31 geographically co-located on NATO air bases where they operate together
with an air wing of the host nation. These squadrons are under USEUCOM32‘s10
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task directly NATO’s delivery air bases; in other words, if the Alliance decides collec-
tively on (de-)escalatory measures, one person commands and controls all the units
that could be tasked for these most sensitive missions. This approach satisfies the
NPT since the nuclear weapons remain wholly under American custody and control.
The survivability and operational readiness of units required to undertake a strike
mission are enhanced by storing the special weapons as close as possible to the strike
aircraft, avoiding any reduction in operational readiness and negative impact on the
deterrence and defence role of the capabilities.
2. Is storing American nuclear weapons on the European 
continent indispensable?
Against the general backdrop of the current security environment and that nuclear
weapons will not vanish from the face of the earth in the foreseeable future, there
are a number of additional critical concerns that undeniably and fundamentally
support the retention of American nuclear weapons on the European continent:
• Sub-strategic nuclear deterrence continues to have a valid role in the prevention
of war and could eventually lend its weight to international negotiations aiming
at multilateral nuclear arms control; only through such negotiations can a verifi-
able and credible nuclear disarmament programme be envisaged. Unilateral initi-
atives in the past have not led to (global) nuclear disarmament and any such
action today would appear at best naïve. Without the US B61 and European DCA,
the Alliance and the majority of European Allies would have very little33 to offer
in any negotiations on arms control and/or disarmament, particularly in recog-
nising that Russia has thousands of tactical nuclear weapons and is unwilling to
give these up. Giving away bargaining chips before the discussion begins dimin-
ishes the chances for success;
• Unilateral removal of NATO’s weapons will inherently entail the risk of exposure
to coercion for European countries; they would face a much higher degree of
uncertainty, and security on the European continent would consequently suffer
at times when Europe has no European alternative at her disposal;
• European Allies often feel the need for reassurance from the US that it views their
security and survival as seriously as they do themselves. Their apprehension rests
on the credibility of the security commitments for extended deterrence which
only works if all domains of the military power are covered, including the nuclear
domain. By extending its conventional and nuclear deterrence, the US demon-
strates in a credible and convincing way that the security of all the Allies is as
crucial and important to it as its own national security interests. NATO’s current
nuclear role sharing is extremely important as it goes beyond pure perception11
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that American nuclear weapons are stationed on European soil and are thus
clearly available to the Alliance. It is noteworthy that NATO’s nuclear sharing is
often described as 5% to deter the Russians and 95% to reassure the European
Allies;
• NATO’s nuclear role sharing is the only collective option on European soil to
guarantee European security. France eventually sharing its “force de frappe” in a
EU framework will not be a viable option for the foreseeable future for a number
of reasons, inter alia it will be extremely hard and very time consuming to recon-
cile national positions of the EU Member States on the matter of nuclear
weapons;
• It is highly unlikely that the US would accept an arrangement in being the only
Ally to provide a nuclear shield for Europe’s security and defence without
support or cooperation of other Allies;
• The European Allies are unlikely to accept dependence on the US’ nuclear
arsenal solely on American soil without having a political say given that they
currently have it in NATO’s multilateral decision-making process, which is regu-
larly exercised. Currently, all European Allies sit at the NATO table and decide
consensually on (de)-escalatory options;
• Removing American nuclear weapons from Europe would not only of itself
psychologically and overtly weaken deterrence in global, political terms but it
would also be an irretrievable step in fundamentally changing the European secu-
rity architecture such that future infrastructure could be lacking and NATO air
bases would not be sufficiently ready or equipped to execute a nuclear strike
mission. Another consequence is that the Alliance would almost certainly find it
politically much harder to reach unity and consensus in a time of crisis when
deciding on how to achieve the intercontinental transfer of the nuclear weapons
to Europe, even assuming that European Allies were still militarily ready to partic-
ipate in a nuclear strike mission and that the necessary infrastructure was still in
place (etc.).
In short, the removal of American nuclear weapons from the European continent
would severely restrict the deterrence and defence options for the European Allies.
It would undoubtedly end nuclear role sharing and bring into question the US’
supreme guarantee as it exists today. The only winning party in such a scenario,
apart from any potential adversary, would be the US that would have to invest less
in European security. There is a real risk of decoupling European from American
security.
In addition, there would be major global consequences. As a consequence of
European circumstances, the US’ allies and partners that currently rely on the12
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consider developing their own national nuclear armament programmes. This in turn
would cause ramifications elsewhere in the world; for example, by leading nations in
and around the Pacific to develop their own nuclear weapons with the further conse-
quence of new and dangerous arms races. What happens in Europe, does not remain
without consequences outside Europe.
3. Nuclear role sharing: Allies are contributing with DCA role to 
the supreme guarantee
Non-nuclear European Allies with a DCA role participate in the planning and the
execution of the Alliance’s nuclear mission. Other non-nuclear European Allies are
encouraged to (also) contribute to the nuclear sharing role through SNOWCAT. All
these Allies view this as their way of contributing to the Alliance’s supreme
guarantee.
While European Allies are able to communicate on their national contributions to the
DCA role, Allies will always ‘neither confirm nor deny’ when it comes to the presence
(or not) of any nuclear weapons on their territory as these are under American
custody.
In NATO’s early years, nuclear deterrence was needed to compensate for the imbal-
ance in the number of conventional forces compared to the Warsaw Pact. Coinci-
dently, many DCA Allies (with Belgium a textbook example) are among the poorest
performing Allies on the burden sharing scale and, in a way, they partly compensate
for their conventional underperformance through their contributions to NATO’s
nuclear role sharing. Without these contributions they would have to invest consid-
erably (very much) more in their conventional capabilities to achieve even a similar
level of deterrence.
DCA Allies have the capabilities, the know-how and the expertise to conduct nuclear
strike missions. They must have the best capabilities at their disposal including
combat ready pilots at the highest operational readiness, the best, or most modern,
fighter aircraft and equipment; trained personnel and procedures that have been
exercised frequently and evaluated against the highest NATO standards and require-
ments. It is therefore quite clear that the air forces of these countries are able to
conduct other defensive and offensive air operations for NATO and/or the EU with
the same airframes and pilots. Politically, this provides DCA Allies with many further
military options when it comes to participating in conventional air operations; this
offers further opportunities at the national political level.
DCA Allies’ commitment is important in the continuous debate on risk and burden
sharing among the 30 Allies. For smaller nations, like Belgium and the Netherlands,
operating DCA undoubtedly gains them respect among the Allies, particularly the US,13
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weight” as they have a seat at the “big boy table”34. This is certainly reflected in the
consequent influence they hold at the political level of the Alliance.
Finally, nothing stands in the way of European Allies continuing with a DCA role while
politically also calling for arms control and disarmament. The policy of pursuing such
a dual track approach accordingly remains fully credible and valid even though
today there is little hope for realistic and verifiable arms control, non-proliferation
and disarmament. Their calls would be ignored were it not for their DCA responsibil-
ities. In recent months, the leadership of the Germany centre-left party SPD has
reignited the debate on the storing of US nuclear weapons on German soil35.
However, the German MFA, Heiko Maas (also SPD), argued in the debate that
“unilateral steps that undermine trust will not bring us any closer to the goal of a
nuclear weapons-free world” and that if such steps were taken “Germany would no
longer be sitting at the table” in terms of anything of importance associated with
disarmament processes. This dual track approach is highly relevant politically for (not
only) Belgium.
4. The current DCA-countries should hold on to the status quo
Controversial discussions such as those in Germany may cause other Allies, e.g. the
Netherlands, Belgium or Italy to similarly raise such issues and follow a German
decision36. Also, a parliamentary debate37 was held in Belgium on a resolution
demanding both the removal of US nuclear weapons stationed in Belgium and joining
the UN treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons (TPNW); it was only narrowly38
rejected early this year.
DCA locations are a legacy of where nuclear weapons were stationed during the Cold
War. They needed to be at an acceptable distance from, but close enough to, the
borders of the Warsaw Pact countries in order to deter them from attacking NATO
territory. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the USSR, NATO’s
borders have shifted eastwards as a result of NATO enlargement. The co-location of
the aircraft and weapons is of paramount importance to avoid any reduction in
operational readiness and negative impact on the deterrence and defence role of the
capabilities. Today, Poland with strong support from the Baltic states argues that
American nuclear weapons should be stationed closer to NATO’s eastern border;
that is, on its territory. However, most Allies would view this as a contravention of
the NATO Russia Founding Act and, in particular, its “three no’s”39; they want to
‘hold the higher morale ground’ in continuing to respect the Act, even though Russia
clearly stopped doing so from the time of the Ukraine crisis.
However, eastern Allies do not accept that their security should depend on an Act
which was drawn up at a time when they were not yet members of NATO. Eastern14
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NATO’s nuclear posture in Europe in order to adjust it to the challenge of dual-
capable land-based missile system deployed by Russia, that was the reason for the
termination of the INF Treaty. This might lead to deepening intra-European and US-
European rifts and decrease the cohesion of NATO.”40 In May 2020, the US ambas-
sador in Warsaw even suggested relocating US nuclear weapons from Germany to
Poland “on NATO’s eastern flank”. Such a move would undoubtedly be regarded by
Russia as extremely provocative and would also make the B61 bombs more vulner-
able.
If the US and the eastern Allies would opt for an arrangement whereby the US
cooperates bilaterally with central and eastern European beneficiaries41, just like the
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)42, would bring a worst case or nightmare
scenario closer to reality. Whilst such a bilateral approach for nuclear sharing would
ensure the continuation of the supreme guarantee for the applicable nations, it
would also bring to an end NATO’s collective political control over the nuclear
weapons on European soil. In addition, it is even likely that NATO would not be able
to overcome such a major upheaval at a time when Europe lacks any equivalent alter-
native. Admittedly, the risk for such a scenario has conceivably reduced with the
incoming Biden Administration; however, this reduction may well not last given the
perceived growing instability in American foreign policy. Current DCA countries
should hold on to the status-quo that is providing predictability and stability to the
European security environment. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain
a nuclear alliance.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BELGIAN FOREIGN SECURITY 
POLICY AND DEFENCE
Since the author inherently has a much better understanding of Belgian affairs, his
recommendations are intrinsically focused on Belgian foreign security policy and
defence. That said, many of his recommendations are likely to also pertain to other
DCA countries.
Europeans may (rather: should) regret this, but today there is no alternative to
NATO’s nuclear role sharing at hand in an exclusively European context. As long as
nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. Nuclear role sharing in
the NATO framework is the only available option for Europe’s and Belgium’s security
and defence. There is no room for unilateral decisions on our DCA role and on our
policy regarding the stationing of American nuclear weapons on European soil. Such
decisions would have serious and undesirable strategic ramifications in Europe and15
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cooperation which is a corner stone of our foreign security policy.
Belgium’s DCA role allows her to pursue in a credible manner a double track policy of
coupling deterrence and defence with calls for global nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament. Nuclear sharing in the NATO framework underpins Belgium’s support
for NATO’s strategic objective of security at the lowest possible level of forces.
Indeed, Belgium should continue to pursue a safer world for all and continue to
create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.
Belgium should significantly increase her efforts in the conventional domain and
meet all the capability requirements that the other Allies expect of her. Even if this
were to be done with an immediate and lasting sense of urgency, this nonetheless
represents a long-term endeavour which is likely to be achieved within 10 years at
best, or perhaps more realistically even 20 years.
On the basis of the evidence put forward in this paper, it is clear that Belgium unilat-
erally is neither in a position to reconsider her DCA role nor decide to remove the
ability to station American nuclear weapons on her territory. Decisions of this kind
would denigrate her international standing and erode her traditional role on arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Thus, and in taking into account the
prevailing European and global security environment, maintaining the status-quo is
the only recommendation that can be made and it should be viewed as a lasting
option for the time being as there is simply no alternative for NATO’s nuclear role
sharing.
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